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Risk Management with Derivatives by Dealers and  
Market Quality in Government Bond Markets 
 
 Abstract 
 
This paper examines how bond dealers use futures markets to manage the hedgeable 
market risk component of their core business risk exposure, and whether market quality is 
adversely affected by their selective risk taking activity. It also investigates the efficiency of 
market risk sharing within a decentralized semi-transparent market structure. We find that 
dealers engage in duration targeting, behaving as if they have a comparative advantage in 
bearing interest rate risk. They make significant directional bets often by holding futures that 
are in the same direction as the spot.  They actively use futures to hedge changes in the spot 
exposure. They hedge changes in their spot exposure more when the potential costs of 
regulatory distress are high, when the cost of such hedging is low, and during periods of 
greater uncertainty. We find that duration targeting by dealers has adverse price effects due to 
capital constraints as predicted by Froot and Stein (1998). Finally, we find that trades in the 
spot market are not executed by dealers with extreme exposures. In this context, we 
recommend market reforms such as introduction of central quote posting or limit order book 
that will enable more efficient matching of liquidity demanders and suppliers, reduce trading 
costs, and improve the quality of risk sharing. 
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Risk Management with Derivatives by Dealers and  
Market Quality in Government Bond Markets 
 
The risk management practices of corporations have received wide attention in recent years 
largely due to some well-publicised cases of losses incurred by firms as a result of trading in 
derivatives1. The theoretical literature provides several motivations for why corporations should use 
derivatives to manage their risk2. From an empirical perspective, our understanding of corporate risk 
management practices has improved significantly in recent years, thanks to Wharton/CIBC surveys, to 
changes in the public disclosure requirements that has enabled extensive empirical research, and to 
case studies that describe the risk management practices of specific firms and industries3. 
In contrast, we know relatively little about the risk management practices of market 
intermediaries. Theoretical modeling of the risk management problem faced by market intermediaries 
has been very recent (Froot and Stein, 1998). On the empirical side, microstructure researchers have 
shown how intermediaries charge a bid-ask spread to protect themselves against adverse selection risk 
and individual asset inventory risk, and how dealers manage the specific risk implicit in their 
individual asset inventories. However, we do not as yet know much about how intermediaries manage 
the hedgeable market risk component of their core business risk, and the role that derivatives contracts 
play in this risk management4. In particular, we do not know the extent to which intermediaries 
engage in selective market risk-taking. We also do not know whether, and to what extent, market 
                                                 
1 Metallgesellschaft, Orange County, and Proctor and Gamble reported large losses as a result of trading in 
derivatives while Daimler Benz reported large losses for not using derivatives to hedge its dollar receivables. 
2 See for example, Holthausen (1979), Anderson and Danthine (1981), Stulz (1984), Smith and Stulz (1985), 
Shapiro and Titman (1986), DeMarzo and Duffie (1991, 1995), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), Ljungqvist 
(1994), May (1995), Stulz (1996), Raposo (1996), Degeorge, Moselle and Zeckhauser (1996), Breeden and 
Viswanathan (1998), Mello and Parsons (2000) for risk management by firms or managers of firms.  
3 See Tufano and Serbin (1993), Tufano (1994), Tufano and Headley (1994a, b), and Haushalter (1997) for case 
studies on risk management. For empirical research, see, e.g., Booth, Smith and Stolz (1984), Block and 
Gallagher (1986), Wall, Pringle and McNulty (1990), Francis and Stephan (1990), Nance, Smith and Smithson 
(1993), Dolde (1993, 1995), Mian (1996), Tufano (1996), Hogan and Rossi (1997), Peterson and Thiagarajan 
(1997), Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997, 1999), Allayannis and Ofek (1997), Haushalter (1997), Schrand and 
Unal (1998), Henschel and Kothari (1998), Guay (1998), Whidbee and Wohar (1999), Lynch Kosky and Pontiff 
(1999), Graham and Smith (1999), Graham and Rogers (2000) and Guay and Kothari (2001). 
4 There exists literature on hedging with futures contracts in the US government bond market (see, e.g., Kane 
and Marcus (1986), Hemler (1990) and Barnhill 1990). However, the focus of our work is very different.   
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quality is affected by this selective market risk-taking in the wake of capital constraints.  
Our paper contributes to the literature in three important ways. First, it analyzes how bond 
dealers trade in futures markets to manage their spot market risk exposure. Second, it examines, in the 
context of capital adequacy constraints, the relationship between the dealers’ selective market risk-
taking activity and market quality. Finally, it investigates how market risk gets shared between dealers 
within a decentralised trading structure that has limited transparency. We conduct our investigation 
using a comprehensive dataset provided by the Bank of England. The data include the daily close-of-
business positions (long or short) of individual UK government bond dealers in every UK government 
bond issue, and in related interest rate futures contracts. Using these data, we investigate three major 
issues of interest to academics, regulators, practitioners and investors at large.  
First, we investigate how financial intermediaries use futures markets to manage the 
hedgeable market risk component of their core business risk, namely, interest rate risk. This question 
is of considerable interest to academics because there exist two different views in the literature about 
the extent and type of risks that intermediaries carry on their books. Froot and Stein (1998) argue that 
financial intermediaries should fully hedge their exposure to any efficiently tradeable risk, while Stulz 
(1996) contends that some firms potentially have a comparative advantage in bearing certain risks, 
and they should exploit this comparative advantage by engaging in selective risk taking. The 
implications are different because the assumptions are different. Froot and Stein (1998) assume that 
intermediaries do not enjoy any informational advantage over other market participants. This is 
unlikely to be the case for dealer firms in bond markets since these firms see a large part of the order 
flow and the empirical market microstructure literature suggests that order flow is informative5. 
Therefore we should find that bond dealers exploit their information through selective market risk-
taking by following a duration targeting policy. We should also find that dealers who execute a 
greater proportion of order flow carry a greater amount of risk on their books and profit more from 
their informational advantage. Finally we should find that dealers’ risk management decisions depend 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Easely and O’Hara (1987), Barclay and Warner (1993), Lyons (1995), Keim and Madhavan (1996), 
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on economic factors such as uncertainty in the market place, mispricing in futures markets, and the 
likelihood of regulatory distress through breach of capital adequacy requirements.  
Second, we investigate whether dealers’ selective market risk-taking policy affects their 
ability to provide liquidity to investors and therefore affects market quality, an issue of significant 
interest to academics and regulators. If dealers follow a duration targeting policy, then a part of their 
limited capital gets allocated to bearing hedgeable risk, risk that could have been laid off using futures 
contracts. This effectively reduces the amount of capital available for bearing security specific risk 
and providing liquidity to public investors. This, according to Froot and Stein (1998), should affect 
the prices at which dealers will be ready to execute trades. Clearly, the greater the extent of duration 
targeting, the lower will be the amount of capital available for providing liquidity to investors, and 
worse will be the prices offered to trades that make demands on dealers’ capital. Therefore, we 
investigate if dealers’ selective risk taking activity significantly affects market quality. 
Finally, we examine whether overall market risk gets shared efficiently in a competitive 
dealership market that is not fully transparent, an issue of considerable interest to academics and 
regulators. Theoretical models of competitive dealership markets like Ho and Stoll (1983) and Biais 
(1993) show that public buy (sell) orders get best prices when they are executed by dealers with 
longest (shortest) inventory positions. Like the foreign exchange market, the US Treasury bond 
market and various over-the-counter markets, the UK government bond market has limited pre-trade 
transperency since there is no central quote posting facility or a consolidated limit order book. As a 
result, investors can encounter considerable search costs while finding the dealer offering the best 
price, i.e., the dealer with extreme exposure. Our data provides an opportunity to investigate how 
liquidity provision and market risk sharing takes place in these semi-transparent markets.  
We find that dealers engage extensively in selective market risk-taking through duration 
targeting. The size of their futures position is comparable in magnitude to their spot position and their 
futures position usually reinforces the risk of their spot position. However, interestingly, we find that 
                                                                                                                                                        
Easley et al (1997), and Hansch et al (1999).  
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the dealers actively use futures contracts to offset or hedge changes in their spot position. This offset 
is partial in most cases. We also find that dealers use futures markets to a greater extent when the cost 
of hedging is lower, when the likelihood of regulatory distress (through breach of capital adequacy 
requirements) is greater, and during periods of greater economic uncertainty.  
We find that dealers with higher turnover engage in greater amount of selective market risk-
taking and hedge changes in their spot exposure relatively less when compared with dealers with 
smaller turnover. This behaviour supports Stulz (1996) in as much as dealers with higher turnover see 
a greater proportion of the order flow and arguably have, or think they have, a greater comparative 
informational advantage relative to dealers with smaller turnover. However, we find that dealers with 
higher turnover do not earn profits from their selective risk-taking that are significantly greater than 
the profits of dealers with smaller turnover. This suggests that UK government bond markets are 
efficient, and the order flow related informational advantage of bond dealers is more perceived than 
real.  
We also find that the fact that dealers do not fully hedge their market risk through derivatives 
affects market quality when dealers’ selective market risk exposure is of substantial magnitude. We 
find asymmetric price effects. Trades that worsen (relax) dealers’ capital adequacy constraints 
experience significantly worse (better) prices. This finding strongly supports Froot and Stein’s (1998) 
argument about the price effects of capital adequacy constraints. Regulators interested in market 
quality should be concerned about this (asymmetric) adverse effect of dealers selectively taking on 
market risk that they could have hedged efficiently through the futures market. 
Finally, in terms of efficient allocation of market risk among themselves, we find that dealers 
with extreme total risk exposures do absorb a greater amount of risk. However, this is driven by their 
trading in the futures market and not by their trading in the spot market. In the spot market, we do not 
find any evidence that dealers with relatively long (short) total risk position sell (buy) a greater 
amount of spot risk. This finding also has important implications for regulators concerned about the 
quality of execution offered to public investors. We know from Ho and Stoll (1983) and Biais (1993) 
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that the price a dealer charges to a buy or sell trade is monotone function of her risk exposure. 
Therefore, a public buy (sell) trade receives best price if it is executed by a dealer with the shortest 
(longest) exposure. To the extent that public trades are not executed by dealers with divergent 
exposures, those trades do not receive the best execution possible. This suggests that trading costs in 
the UK government bond market (and potentially other markets with similar trading structure) can be 
lowered if public investors can be matched more effectively with dealers carrying extreme exposures. 
Therefore, regulators concerned about quality of execution in competitive dealership markets should 
consider market reforms that increase pre-trade transperency and thereby enable a better matching of 
public investors (liquidity demanders) and dealers with divergent inventories (most suitable liquidity 
suppliers). Examples of such reform are the introduction of a central quote posting facility or a 
consolidated limit order book. This will reduce trading costs and improve risk sharing and liquidity 
provision in these markets. 
To summarise, our paper complements and contributes to the existing literature on risk 
management by examining for the first time three important issues. The first issue is how 
intermediaries manage the (hedgeable) market risk component of their core business risk with 
derivatives. Unlike the case of thrifts analysed in the literature, interest rate risk represents the core 
business risk of bond dealers, and our data help quantify precisely the amount of hedgeable core 
business risk financial intermediaries carry on their books and measure the profits arising from their 
selective market risk-taking activity. The second issue is the relation between intermediaries’ selective 
risk-taking activity and market quality in the context of capital adequacy constraints. And the third 
issue is the efficiency of risk-sharing in decentralized and semi-transparent financial markets. In the 
context of all of these, it is important to note that our paper analyses the risk management practices of 
sophisticated market professionals who, compared to managers of traditional firms, are in a better 
position to understand and manage their risk. This is because they are exposed to a single source of 
risk, namely, interest rate risk, and there exist highly liquid futures markets that enable efficient 
management of that risk.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section I describes the salient features of the 
UK Government bond market and the data analyzed in this paper. Section II outlines the measures 
used for analyzing the risk exposure of spot and derivative positions. Section III provides a 
descriptive analysis of risk exposures of and profits made by different bond dealers. Section IV 
examines how intermediaries manage their spot risk with derivatives. Section V investigates the 
selective risk taking and hedging behavior of higher turnover dealers (who arguably enjoy 
comparative advantage due to order flow information) relative to lower turnover dealers. Section VI 
examines price effects of capital adequacy constraints and the relationship between intermediary risk 
taking and market quality. Section VII investigates how risk gets shared and liquidity is provided in 
semi-transparent markets. Section VIII offers concluding remarks. 
 
I.  The Data and the Salient Features of the UK Government Bond Market  
Our sample period runs from August 1994 to December 1995. In August 1994, there were ninety 
different issues of gilts with a nominal outstanding value of £205 billion (see Appendix A for 
details)6. Trading in these UK government bonds is organised on the London Stock Exchange in a 
competitive dealership environment with several dealer firms competing with each other to execute 
the public order flow7. During our sample period, the dealer firms were required to be independent 
legal entities separately capitalised from the parent firm. They also had to register themselves with the 
Bank of England, the supervising regulatory authority and were required to report to the Bank every 
day their close-of-business inventory position in each government bond issue and in related 
derivatives contracts. Our data consists of the daily close-of-business reports filed by the dealer firms 
from August 1, 1994 to December 30, 1995 (358 business days).  It provides individual dealer’s 
inventory positions in each bond issue (number of bonds and whether long or short) and in related 
                                                 
6 The London Stock Exchange Quarterly reports that in 1994, the total turnover in UK government bonds was 
£1,545 billion in about 700,000 trades, corresponding to an average trade size of £2.2 million. However, the 
median trade size was much smaller, less than £100,000. During our sample period, there was no Strips market 
or Repo market in the UK Government bonds. These developments took place in 1996-97. 
7 See Proudman (1995), Vitale (1998) and Hansch and Saporta (1999) for microstructural details of the UK 
   
 
   7
futures contracts (number of futures contracts and whether long or short). We analyse the close-of-
business reports of fifteen dealer firms (see Appendix B for relevant financial details of twelve of 
these dealer firms).  Out of our fifteen dealers, five dealers report positions in seventy or more bonds, 
six dealers between fifty to seventy bonds and remaining four dealers in less than fifty bonds. All 
dealers report positions in long-term bond futures contract (called the long-gilt futures contract) traded 
on LIFFE - the London International Financial Futures Exchange. These positions are typically in the 
nearest maturity contract, rolled forward to the next maturity contract in the expiry month. 
Occasionally, some dealers report small positions in the three-month LIBOR interest rate futures 
contract. However, more than 99% of their futures risk exposure comes from positions in the long-gilt 
futures contracts8.  
In figures IA and IB, we plot snapshots of the zero coupon yield curves for UK Government 
bonds at six-monthly intervals from January 1993 to January 1996. This provides a picture of the 
interest rate volatility in the UK government bond market immediately before and during our sample 
period. It is evident that there were large shifts in the term structure before the start of the sample 
period (Figure I.A) when interest rates at the long end first fell by about 250 basis points from January 
1993 to January 1994 and then rose again by about 125 basis points up to July 1994. Over the sample 
period itself (Figure I.B), the long end remained virtually unchanged and there has been some, but not 
excessive, volatility in the medium maturity term structure range.  
 
II.   Measures of Systematic Risk Exposure 
We compute the systematic risk of a dealer’s bond portfolio using a theoretical measure and 
an empirical measure. We use the modified Macaulay duration of a bond as our theoretical measure of 
its systematic risk while we use the number of futures contracts one needs to trade in order to hedge 
                                                                                                                                                        
government bond market.  
8 No dealer reports any positions in options on interest rate futures contracts. The annual reports of the dealer 
firms do not also report any options’ positions. This may be because during our sample period, the options 
market in London was relatively illiquid and not very deep. In particular, the average net exposure 
corresponding to the total open interest in option contracts on Long Gilt Futures was of the order of 2% to 3% of 
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that bond as our empirical measure of its systematic risk9.  
A. Theoretical Measure of Risk Exposure 
We compute the modified Macaulay duration (henceforth, simply referred to as duration) Di,t 
at time t of bond i (i = 1,…, 90 in our sample) maturing at time T as: 
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where Pi,t is the market price of bond i at time t; Ci,t+s is the cash flow received from bond i, s 
periods after time t; and tiy , is the yield to maturity on bond i at time t. 
We measure the theoretical (duration based) Spot Exposure of dealer k as at the end of day t as  
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where  ktiV ,  is the Pound Sterling value of the position (duly signed) of dealer k in bond i  at 
the end of day t and tiD ,  is the Duration of bond i as defined in equation (1) above. 
Similarly, we measure theoretical (duration based) Futures Exposure of dealer k at the end of day t as 
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where ktjW ,  is the Pound Sterling value of the position (duly signed) of dealer k in futures 
contract j at the end of day t; and tjD ,  is the duration of the futures contract (based on 
the cheapest-to-deliver bond) at the end of day t. 
 
B. Empirical Measure of Risk Exposure 
                                                                                                                                                        
the average net exposure corresponding to the total open interest in Long Gilt Futures contracts.  
9Arguably, there exist systematic risk factors other than duration in the bond markets. Chaumenton et al (1996) 
examine the relative explanatory power of different risk factors in the UK government bond market. They find 
that (see their Table 3) the second factor adds an extra 3.4% explanatory power over the 86.4% provided by 
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Our empirical measure of the systematic risk of a bond is based on the number of Long Gilt 
futures contracts one needs to trade in order to hedge the systematic (or hedgeable) risk of a bond 
position. We use the “beta” of a bond vis-à-vis the Long Gilt Futures contract as our empirical 
measure of the systematic risk of that bond. We estimate the risk iβ of the bond by regressing the 
daily bond return on the daily return on a Long Gilt Futures contract. In particular, we run the 
following regression   
, , ,i t i i f t i tR a Rβ η= + +            (4) 
where Ri,t is the return on bond i from day t-1 to day t; R,f,t is the return on the Long Gilt 
Futures contract from day t-1 to day t; and iβ is the slope coefficient or the “beta” of 
that bond vis-à-vis the Long Gilt Futures contract.  
We estimate the systematic (or hedgeable) risk of a bond on a rolling basis using price data over the 
previous three-month period10. We denote the systematic risk of a bond i on day t by ti ,β  where the 
subscript t denotes that a three-month period ending on day t is used to estimate the risk of that bond 
as on day t. To make the empirical measure comparable with the theoretical measure and represent 
also the change in wealth corresponding to a 1% change in interest rates, we define the empirical 
measure as the duration of the cheapest-to-deliver bond for the futures contract, multiplied by the 
weighted average of the pound sterling value of the position held in different bonds, with the bond 
“betas” as the weights.  
We define the empirical (beta based) Spot Exposure of dealer k as at the end of day t as 
90
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1 100
k
i t i t j tE
k t
i
V D
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=∑    (5) 
where  ktiV ,  is the Pound value of the position (duly signed) of dealer k in bond i at the end of 
day t; ti ,β  is the systematic risk of bond i on date t, and tjD ,  is the duration of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
duration (i.e. Shift). Therefore, we select duration as our proxy for the systematic risk factor in our analyses.  
10 We adjust the beta estimate of illiquid bonds using the Cohen et al (1983) procedure. 
   
 
   10
futures  contract (based on the cheapest-to-deliver bond) at the end of day t. 
Similarly, we define the empirical Futures Exposure of dealer k at the end of day t as 
∑
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                   (6) 
where  ktjW ,  is the Pound Sterling value of the position (duly signed) of dealer k in futures 
contract j at the end of day t, and tjD ,  is the duration of the futures  contract (based 
on the cheapest-to-deliver bond) at the end of day t. 
The theoretical measure differs from the empirical measure because the former weights bonds by their 
duration while the latter weights them by their beta vis-à-vis the Long Gilt futures contract. In a 
frictionless world in which duration captures all term structure risk, the two would be identical. 
However, if the factor representing rotation of the yield curve is important, or if some bonds are 
illiquid, then the beta of the bonds would be different from the ratio of their durations11. We find the 
average correlation between risk exposures of the fifteen dealers estimated by the two measures to be 
0.92 for spot exposure and 0.85 for spot-plus-futures exposure. 
 
III.   Descriptive Analyses of Spot and Futures Risk Exposure 
A. Magnitude of Total (i.e. Spot-plus-Futures) Risk Exposures 
The first row of Table I describes the absolute value of the total (i.e., spot-plus-futures) risk 
exposures carried by the dealers overnight, using both the theoretical duration-based measure and the 
empirical beta-based measure. As the maximum to minimum range indicates, there is considerable 
variation in the average risk exposures across dealers. From a one percent change in interest rates, the 
biggest dealer stands to gain or lose about £32 Million (£26 Million) while the smallest dealer stands 
to gain or loose about £1.5 Million (£1.3 Million) by the theoretical (empirical) measure. The mean 
                                                 
11 Figure 2 plots the beta versus the duration for the 90 bonds. As we can see, most of the bonds fall on a straight 
line, with beta values corresponding approximately to the values that we would expect on the basis of duration. 
About 7 or 8 bonds – all of them at the short end - are above the line, while about four times that number are 
below the line. Most of the bonds below the line are long maturity bonds, which are relatively illiquid. As a 
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and median risk exposures across the dealers are £12 million (£10 million) and £10 million (£8  
million) respectively using theoretical (empirical) measure12.  The last column of Table II denoted as 
‘Overall’ reports the information for the dealers as a group. We construct the ‘Overall’ position each 
day by aggregating the duly signed positions of each dealer in every bond issue and in every futures 
contract. The average total risk exposure carried by the dealers in the aggregate equals £161 Million 
(£134 Million) using theoretical (empirical) measure13. Figures 3 and 4 plot the time series variation 
in the ‘Overall’ end of day total, i.e., spot-plus-futures, risk exposures of the dealers in aggregate. As 
can be seen, the dealers as a group engage in duration targeting in a big way and their target has been 
consistently negative during our sample period. 
B. Signed Values of Spot Exposure and Futures Exposure  
The second row of Table I describes the variation in the signed values of average spot 
exposures of the dealers. The average individual spot exposures is negative for an overwhelming 
majority of the dealers. It varies from -£28 million (-£22 million) to £0.6 million (£0.3 million) using 
theoretical (empirical) measure. The mean, median and Overall spot risk exposures equal -£6 million 
(-£4 million), -£3 million (-£3 million) and  -£87 million (-£61 million) respectively. Interestingly, the 
average signed futures exposure of dealers (see row three of Table I) are of same sign and of similar 
magnitude as the signed spot exposures. In particular, the average futures exposure varies from -£20 
million (-£22 million) to -£0.2 million (-£0.2 million) using theoretical (empirical) measure. The 
mean, median and ‘Overall’ futures risk exposures respectively are -£5 million (-£5 million), -£3 
million (-£3 million) and -£74 million (-£73 million).  
                                                                                                                                                        
result, our empirical measure is somewhat less in magnitude relative to our theoretical measure. 
12 Changes in interest rates on normal days are typically of the order of few basis points. The numbers appear 
high because they correspond to a one percent change in interest rates. These risk exposures can also be 
expressed in terms of the one-day 1% level Value-at-Risk (VAR) using average daily volatility of the long-gilt 
futures contract price of about 0.5%. The average empirical exposures correspond to a one-day 1% level VAR 
of about £6 Million for the biggest dealer and about £0.2 dealer for the smallest dealer. As a fraction of the value 
of equity shareholders funds of the dealer firm, the average VAR (across all dealers, and all days of the sample 
period) equals 4.9% of their equity funds. This average VAR varies from 0.6% to 12.5% of the equity 
shareholders funds for different dealers. 
13 The minimum ‘Overall’ exposure is £81 million (£44 million) while the maximum Overall exposure equals 
£296 million (£229 million) during the sample period. These correspond to a VAR of £22 million on average, 
minimum of £7 million and maximum of £38 million. 
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We shed further light on the similarities in the magnitude and the direction of average spot 
and futures exposures in several ways. We examine whether the dealers prefer to use one market over 
the other to achieve their duration target by computing the magnitude of futures exposure as a 
percentage of the magnitude of spot exposure plus the magnitude of the futures exposure for 
individual bond dealers. We find that (see Table I row 4) the average value of this fraction across 
dealers has a mean of 36% (42%) and a median of 33% (43%) percent with the theoretical (empirical) 
measure. At an ‘Overall’ level, this fraction has a mean of 47% (53%) and a median of 49% (55%). 
This suggests that the dealers rely on the spot market and futures markets more or less equally to 
achieve their target. 
We examine whether futures exposure reinforces (or offsets) spot exposure by computing the 
spot-futures-offset ratio. Towards that end we divide a dealer’s ‘net total exposure’ by her ‘gross total 
exposure’ at the end of each day, subtract the ratio from one and define it as the spot-futures-offset 
ratio14. If futures position exposure reinforces (offsets) the spot position, then this ratio will approach 
0% (100%). We find that (see row five of Table I) the mean and median spot-futures-offset ratio 
equals 27% (30%) and 19% (27%) using the theoretical (empirical) measure. The ‘Overall’ spot-
futures-offset ratio equals 3% (5%). A great majority of the offset ratios are closer to zero percent 
than to one hundred percent. This confirms that the dealers achieve their duration target by taking 
futures positions that are generally in the same direction as their spot position.  
In figures 3 and 4, the futures exposure appears to vary in a direction opposite to that of the 
spot exposure. Therefore, we also examine how the deviation of a dealer’s spot exposure from its 
sample mean relates to the deviation of her futures exposure from its sample mean. Towards that end, 
we also measure dealers’ demeaned spot-futures-offset ratio. We find that (see row six of Table I) the 
mean and median spot-futures-offset ratio equals 40% (44%) and 36% (44%) using the theoretical 
(empirical) measure. The ‘Overall’ spot-futures-offset ratio equals 50% (58%). When we measure the 
                                                 
14  For example, suppose a dealer’s spot exposure and future exposures at the end of a day equal £4 Million and 
-£2 Million respectively. Then, her net total exposure is £2 Million, her gross total exposure is £6 Million and 
her spot-futures offsetting equals 1 – {|2|/|6|}= 0.667 or 66.7%.  
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percentage of days when the demeaned spot and futures exposures are of opposite sign, we find that 
(see row seven of Table I) the mean and median percentage equals 68% (71%) and 69% (76%) using 
the theoretical (empirical) measure. The offsetting in direction of demeaned spot and demeaned 
futures equals 72% (79%) for the ‘Overall’. This suggests that, in general, when a dealer’s spot 
exposure is above its sample mean, her futures exposure is below its sample mean and vice-versa.  
These results highlight three important things. First, the dealers engage extensively in 
duration targeting. Second, they achieve their duration target by taking a position in futures market 
that are of similar order of magnitude and usually in the same direction as their spot position. Finally, 
dealers actively manage the deviation from their duration target by varying their futures exposure in 
such a way that it offsets the changes in their spot exposure. 
C. Profitability of Overnight Risk Taking  
We measure the profit made by the dealers from their selective market risk-taking activity by 
expressing the total empirical risk exposure carried by a dealer at the end of day t in terms of the 
number of futures contracts, and multiplying it by the change in the price of the futures contract from 
the close of day t to the open of day t+1. This product represents the profit arising from dealers’ 
decisions to carry the risk on their books overnight. We report the average daily profits of dealers in 
the bottom panel of Table I. We find that the average daily profit across the dealers has a mean 
(median) of -£2,600 (-£3,000). The dealers collectively make an average daily profit of £22,000 and 
individually it varies from a profit of £40,000 per day to a loss of £54,000 per day across the fifteen 
dealers. Since the profit can also be expressed in terms of the return earned by dealers from their risk-
taking activity, we report their profit per unit of risk carried overnight. The average scaled profit is 
simply the overnight return on the futures contract weighted by the risk carried each night expressed 
in terms of equivalent number of futures contracts.  We find that the average daily scaled profit across 
the dealers has a mean (median) of -1.3 basis points (-4.5 basis points) and it varies from a profit of 25 
basis points per day to a loss of 40 basis points per day across the fifteen dealers15. 
                                                 
15 Looking at the financial statements in Appendix B, one may wonder as to why so many sophisticated 
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IV Risk Management with Futures 
One way to understand the duration targeting behaviour of dealers is to examine the mean 
reversion in their total (spot-plus-futures) risk exposure. If dealers actively control the deviations from 
their duration target, then we should find significant mean reversion in their total risk exposure. 
Towards that end, we run the following regression for each dealer  
, , , , ,( ) ( )k t k t k k k t k t k tS F S Fα γ ε∆ + = + + +   (7) 
where ,k tS is dealer k’s spot risk exposure at the end of day t, ,k tF  is dealer k’s futures risk exposure at 
the end of day t, and , ,( )k t k tS F∆ +  is the change in dealer k’s total risk exposure from day t to day 
t+1, measured as dealer k’s total exposure at the end of day t+1 minus her total exposure at the end of 
day t. A negative and significant kγ implies that dealers actively manage their total risk exposure.  
Table II reports the results of the regression using the theoretical and empirical measures of 
risk exposures. For the purpose of reporting, we rank the dealers in decreasing order of their average 
magnitude of overnight total (spot-plus-futures) exposures using the theoretical measure. We find that 
the total risk exposure of fourteen (fourteen) out of fifteen dealers shows significant mean reversion 
using the theoretical (empirical) measure at the ten percent level. Their mean reversion coefficients 
vary from -0.03 to -0.20 (-0.03 to -0.36) using the theoretical (empirical) measure. These correspond 
to inventory half-lives ranging from 3 days to 36 days (2 days to 28 days).  
The results in Table I and II confirm that during our sample period the dealers had a duration 
target that was negative, and they actively controlled the variance around this target. In order to better 
                                                                                                                                                        
financial institutions have loss-making subsidiaries in this industry. In this context, it is important to mention 
that the parent firms listed in Appendix B also have motives other than profit to create these dealer subsidiaries. 
These dealer firms can provide useful service to the proprietary trading arm or the arbitrage trading desk of the 
parent firm. For example, first, the dealer firms can execute large trades for the parent without leaving much of a 
foot-print that can enable other market participants to infer the information content of the trade. Second, the 
dealer firms can borrow stock and engage in short-selling, otherwise difficult in the UK even for institutions. 
Third, dealer firms are exempt from paying stamp duty for its own trades, which can be useful in the context of 
short-term arbitrage trading strategies. Finally, dealer firms have preferential access to new bond issues. Our 
findings relating to profitability suggests that these other motives for creating dealer subsidiaries may be more 
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understand how dealers control the variation in their risk exposure, we examine the relationship 
between the change in a dealer’s spot exposure and the change in that dealer’s futures exposure. 
Towards that end, we regress the daily change in a dealer’s futures risk exposure on the 
contemporaneous and lagged daily change in her spot exposure16. In particular we run the following 
regression for each dealer 
, , , , 1 ,k t k k k t k l k t k tF a h S h S e−∆ = + ∆ + ∆ +      (8) 
where tkF ,∆  is the change in Futures Exposure of dealer k from end of day t to end of day t+1, tkS ,∆  
is the change in Spot Exposure of dealer k from end of day t to end of day t+1, 1, −∆ tkS is lagged   
change in Spot Exposure of dealer k (from end of day t-1 to end of day t), kh and lkh , are 
contemporaneous and lagged ‘hedge’ ratios, and ka  and ,k te  are the intercept and error terms 
respectively. It is important to note that our use of the word ‘hedge’ ratio is not just for simplicity of 
exposition. Given the fact that interest rate risk represents the dealers’ core business risk, and the fact 
that they engage extensively in selective risk-taking, the economic consequences of hedging are 
measured by the extent to which the dealers offset the changes in their spot exposure by actively 
changing their futures exposure. 
We report the results of regression in equation (8) in Table III. We find that contemporaneous 
hedge ratio hk is significantly negative for each and every dealer and varies from  -0.20 to -0.80 (-0.23 
to –1.06) using the theoretical (empirical) measure. The lagged hedge ratio hk,l is negative and 
significant in case of seven (five) dealers with the theoretical (empirical) measure, and in these cases, 
the magnitude of the lagged hedge ratio is about one-third to one-ninth of hk. The R-squares of the 
regressions for most of the dealers are also high, indicating the economic significance of the relation 
                                                                                                                                                        
important for these parent firms. 
16 We include lagged changes in the spot exposure for several reasons. The dealer may trade with the public or 
other dealers towards the end of the day or after the futures market has closed.  The dealer’s risk management 
actions would then only be observed on the next day. Also, when a dealer receives an order flow, it consists of 
liquidity-based component and information-based component. Since, the dealer is not able to distinguish these 
two components, she may decide to wait before deciding how much of the change in spot exposure needs to be 
hedged through the futures market. 
   
 
   16
between changes in the spot and the futures exposures. Overall, these findings indicate that the dealers 
actively use futures markets to offset the changes in their spot risk and thereby control the variance 
around their duration target.   
The regression in equation (8) measures average hedge ratios. Arguably, there exist factors 
that can potentially influence the extent to which dealers will use futures markets to hedge the 
deviations from their duration target. First, since dealers are risk averse, we should observe that the 
dealers hedge to a greater extent when the volatility of bond market is higher. Second, the risk of 
regulatory distress is greater when the level of spot exposure is relatively high and when the change in 
spot exposure is in a direction that increases the magnitude of this exposure. Therefore, we should 
observe higher hedge ratio on days when the risk of regulatory distress is greater. Third, as argued by 
Stulz (1984), costs should play an important role in the dealers’ decision to use futures markets. A 
major cost faced by the users of futures markets is the predictable change in futures mispricing over 
time17. Short hedges established with underpriced futures, and long hedges established with 
overpriced futures, are relatively costly and vice-versa. Clearly, dealers will have a lesser (greater) 
incentive to use futures markets to hedge in time periods when hedging is costlier (cheaper). Finally, 
there exist several macroeconomic variables (such as the M0 and the M4 measures of money supply, 
and the retail price index) that potentially affect the prices of government bonds. These 
macroeconomic variables are announced on a monthly basis, the date and time of which are well 
known18. One would expect that the perceived information asymmetry would be relatively high (low) 
before (after) these announcements, and therefore, that the dealers hedge more (less) during periods of 
high (low) perceived information asymmetry.   
In view of these arguments, we examine whether dealers hedge the changes in their spot 
exposure relatively more (i) when the bond market volatility is greater; (ii) when the risk of regulatory 
                                                 
17 Mispricing is defined as the difference between the actual futures price and its fair value calculated from the 
cost of carry model. LIFFE data provides both these numbers, details of the cheapest to deliver bond, etc. 
18 For example, during the sample period the Bank of England announced the provisional money supply M0 
estimates three working days after the final Wednesday in the month while it announced the provisional M4 
estimates on fourteenth working day after the last day of the month. 
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distress (through breach of capital adequacy requirements) is higher; (iii) when hedging requires 
buying (selling) underpriced (overpriced) futures, and (iv) prior to important macroeconomic 
announcements19, and vice-versa. We examine this by running the following regression  
( )
, 0 , , , , 1
1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 5 6 , ,
( )k t k t k k t k l k t
Std Std Misp Ann dbAnn
t k t k t t t t k t k t
F D h S h S
Vol S S D D D S
γ
γ γ γ γ γ γ ω
−
− −
∆ = + Σ ∆ + ∆
+ + + ∆ + + + ∆ +
 (9) 
where,  tkF ,∆ , tkS ,∆ , 1, −∆ tkS , kh and lkh , are same as in equation (8), tkD , is a dummy variable which 
takes the value 1 for observations corresponding to dealer k, Volt is the standardized absolute value of 
the open-to-close price change of the near maturity long gilt futures contract, , 1
Std
k tS −  ( , 1
Std
k tS −∆ ) is the 
standardized level (change in level) of dealer k’s spot exposure as the end of day t-1, MisptD  is a 
dummy variable which takes the value 1 when hedging requires buying (selling) underpriced 
(overpriced) futures and the value -1 when hedging requires selling (buying) underpriced (overpriced) 
futures, AnntD  (
dbAnn
tD ) is a dummy variable indicating if day t was an announcement day (a day 
before an announcement day), 0γ and tk ,ω are the intercept and error terms respectively.  
Table IV reports results of regression (9) using both the theoretical and empirical measures of 
risk exposures. We find that, with both measures, the “normal” contemporaneous hedge ratios for 
dealers (the hk’s) continue to be negative and of the same order of magnitude as in Table III, and 
highly significant statistically in the case of 14 out of the 15 dealers (dealer 12 being the exception). 
The lagged hedge ratios continue to be negative, although for some dealers they lose their statistical 
significance. The slope coefficients on volatility, lagged level and lagged change in exposure, and 
future’s mispricing variables ( 1γ to 4γ ) each come out negative and statistically significant at the 5% 
level with the theoretical measure. The results with the empirical measure are similar with the 
                                                 
19 We consider M0, M4 and RPI (retail price index) announcements. Three announcements per month for 
seventeen months give us a total of fifty one announcements. These announcements, like most major 
announcements in the UK, are made at 09:30 hours. Almost all the trading on the day of announcements takes 
place after the announcement is made. This is captured by our day of announcement dummy. 
   
 
   18
exception that the slope coefficient on volatility variable 1γ  remains negative but becomes 
statistically insignificant. With both measures we find the coefficient on the day of announcement 
dummy 5γ  is positive and significant while that on the day before announcement day dummy 6γ  is 
negative and significant20.  
These results confirm that the dealers hedge to a greater extent when the potential costs of 
regulatory distress are higher and when the cost of hedging is lower. The results also confirm that 
dealers hedge relatively more in periods when the perceived information asymmetry is high, such as 
on days before major macroeconomic announcements. Once the announcement is made, the perceived 
information asymmetry is reduced and dealers seem to hedge relatively less. Finally, the dependence 
of the hedge ratio on bond market volatility is in the expected direction, but is significant only with 
theoretical measure. 
 
V Comparative Informational Advantage of Dealers with Higher Turnover 
If order flow carries information (see, e.g., Easley et. al. (1997) and Ito et. al. (1998)), then 
dealers with relatively higher turnover would enjoy a comparative advantage over dealers with lower 
turnover. Then, according to Stulz (1996), we should find that higher turnover dealers (i) engage in 
greater selective risk taking (i.e. duration targeting), (ii) hedge to a lesser extent and (iii) profit more 
from their duration targeting activity as compared to lower turnover dealers. We investigate these 
cross-sectional implications in this section.    
During our sample period, we obtain transactions audit trail data from the London Stock 
Exchange. The data identifies each trade by whether it was a buy or a sell trade and whether the dealer 
executes the trade on his own account or on behalf of a client. This enables us to compute the change 
in inventory of each dealer in each bond on each day of our sample period21. By comparing the 
                                                 
20 There exists extensive market microstructure literature documenting day-of-the-week effects. Conceivably, 
these effects also exist in the government bond markets. Therefore, we also included the day-of-the-week 
dummies in the regression. We found none of the day of the week dummies were significant.     
21 We use the Hansch et al (1998) procedure to construct inventories of bond dealers. They use similar quality 
data for the equities traded on the London Stock Exchange. 
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changes in inventories constructed from the transactions data with those reported in the Bank of 
England data, we obtain the turnover of each of our fifteen dealers during the sample period. We rank 
the dealers in decreasing order of their average daily turnover. We assign a “turnover rank” of one 
(fifteen) to the dealer with the highest (lowest) average daily turnover. We use this turnover rank as a 
proxy for a dealer’s comparative informational advantage.  
We measure the selective market risk-taking of dealers by the average magnitude of their 
overnight total risk exposure. We assign a “duration rank” of one (fifteen) to the dealer with the 
highest (lowest) average magnitude of overnight total (i.e. spot-plus-futures) risk exposure. Similarly, 
we rank the dealers in descending order of their hedge ratios ( kh ) reported in Table II and assign a 
“hedge ratio rank” of one (fifteen) to the dealer with the highest (lowest) hedge ratio. Since these 
hedge ratios are negative, the dealer with rank one (fifteen) offsets the changes in her spot exposure to 
the smallest (greatest) extent. Finally, we rank the dealers in descending order of their profits 
(reported in bottom panel of Table I). As before, we measure profitability in two ways, the average 
daily profits of a dealer; and average daily profits per unit of risk carried overnight by that dealer. We 
assign a “profit rank” of one (fifteen) to the dealer making the most (least) profit.  
We regress the dealers’ duration rank, hedge ratio rank and profit rank on their turnover rank. 
In particular, we run the following cross-sectional regressions across our fifteen dealers (k=1,2,…,15).  
0 1
0 1
0 1
(10 )
(10 )
(10 )
k kk
k k k
k k k
Duration Rank c c Turnover Rank f a
Hedge Ratio Rank d d Turnover Rank g b
Profit Rank e e Turnover Rank n c
= + +
= + +
= + +
 
We report the results in Table V. When we regress the dealers’ duration rank on their turnover 
rank as per in equation (10a), we find 1c to be 0.65 with a t-statistic of 3.08 (0.73 with a t-statistic of 
3.88) with the theoretical (empirical) measure of risk. The adjusted R-square respectively equals 
37.8% and 53.6%. This suggests that, compared to the lower turnover dealers, the higher turnover 
dealers engage in selective risk taking to a significantly greater extent.  This is consistent with higher 
turnover dealers perceiving themselves as having a comparative informational advantage over lower 
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turnover dealers, and therefore engaging in selective risk taking to a greater extent.  
When we regress the dealers’ hedge ratio rank on their turnover rank as per equation (10b), 
we find that 1d to be 0.60 with a t-statistic of 2.75 (0.59 with a t-statistic of 2.61) using the theoretical 
(empirical) measure of risk. The adjusted R-square respectively equals 31.8% and 29.3%. This 
suggests that, compared to the lower turnover dealers, the higher turnover dealers hedge to a 
significantly lesser extent. This is once again consistent with the higher turnover dealers’ perception 
of comparative informational advantage over lower turnover dealers. 
Finally, when we regress the dealers’ profit rank on their turnover rank as per equation (10c), 
we find 1e to be -0.30 with a t-stat. of -1.15 (-0.28 with a t-stat. of -1.06) using the average daily profit 
(average daily profit per unit of risk) measure. The adjusted R-square respectively equals 2.2% and 
0.9%. This indicates the absence of any systematic relationship between the profitability from 
duration targeting activity and the fraction of order flow the dealers execute. In other words, we find 
that higher turnover dealers do not earn relatively greater profits from their duration targeting activity 
compared to lower turnover dealers. This finding is robust to measuring the profitability of risk taking 
using the theoretical measure instead of the empirical measure used above as well as measuring 
profitability in different ways. For example, instead of using close to the open (of next day) price 
change in the futures contract as profit, we measure it as close to close, or close to the best possible 
price next day (i.e., buying at the lowest price and selling at the highest price). Although the different 
measures change the level of profitability, the relationship between profitability and turnover ranking 
continues to remain statistically insignificant.  
Overall these findings support Stulz’s (1996) argument that firms engage in selective risk 
taking based on their perceived comparative informational advantage, though in this particular case, 
the comparative advantage is more perceived than real. The lack of significant relationship between 
turnover and profitability suggests that the UK government bond market is reasonably efficient, and 
observing a greater proportion of order flow does not impart higher turnover dealers a significant 
comparative advantage over lower turnover dealers. This is also consistent with the macro-economic 
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(and hence public) nature of information in the government bond market, to which all dealers 
arguably have equal access.  
 
VI Selective Risk Taking and Market Quality: Price Effects of Capital Constraints   
In this section we examine the relation between dealers’ selective market risk-taking and the 
market quality. Since the bond dealers engage in selective risk taking through duration targeting, a 
part of their capital gets allocated to bearing hedgeable risk. This reduces the amount of capital they 
have for providing liquidity to public investors. Froot and Stein (1998) argue that in the presence of 
capital constraints intermediaries will offer significantly worse (better) prices to trades that increase 
(reduce) the demand on their capital. This effect will be significant when their capital has been 
stretched to relatively extreme levels. We examine this pricing effect of capital adequacy constraints 
created by selective market risk-taking activity of the dealers. While conducting our investigation, we 
take into account relevant microstructure effects, for example, whether the public trades were buys or 
sells, and whether the trades were moving the dealers’ exposure towards the sample mean or away 
from the sample mean. 
The prices that dealers trade on are influenced by three factors. First, there are capital 
adequacy related considerations. These are expected to be important when the magnitude of dealers’ 
total risk exposure is high. Second, there are inventory control considerations. These play an 
important role when the total risk exposure deviates substantially from the sample mean in either 
direction. Finally, it is known that dealers respond asymmetrically to public buy and sell trades in the 
equity market.  For example, Keim and Madhavan (1996) find that dealer buy (i.e. public sell) trades 
taking place in the equities traded on the NYSE depress the price significantly. In contrast, dealer sell 
(i.e. public buy) trades do not lead to significant price effects. We do not know if a similar 
phenomenon occurs in bond markets as well. Nevertheless, we allow for this potentially asymmetric 
price impact of buy and sell trades in our investigation. 
Figure 5 illustrates the essence of our investigation. It shows the evolution of total risk 
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exposure of all dealers taken together during our sample period. As can be seen, the exposure is 
negative throughout and is mean-reverting around the sample mean. A and B (C and D) represent 
days when the overall total exposure is in top (bottom) decile. In the case of top-decile days (like A 
and B) and the bottom-decile days (like C and D), the deviation of the risk from the sample mean is of 
comparable order of magnitude. Therefore, from an inventory control point of view, one would expect 
dealers to treat these days symmetrically. However, this is not the case from a capital adequacy point 
of view. Capital adequacy considerations are unimportant on top decile days. However, they are of 
crucial importance on bottom decile days because on these days the magnitude of the exposure is very 
high. Therefore, on bottom-decile days, one expects the dealers to ask a significantly higher price 
while selling (as these trades make an additional demand on their capital) and to bid a significantly 
higher price while buying (as these trades help alleviate the capital adequacy constraints). We 
summarize these effects in Table VI.  
We examine the price effects of selective market risk-taking activity of dealers by running the 
following regression  
 , , , , , , ,i t i t t Buy Buy i t i t Sell Sell i t i t i tP D D D D I D D Iλ λ ξ∆ = Σ + ∆ + ∆ +           (11) 
where ,i tP∆ is the change in the price of bond i from end of day t-1 to day t, ,i tD is duration of bond 
i on day t, tD  is a dummy representing the day of the sample period, BuyD and SellD are dummies that 
take a value of one if the dealers have collectively bought or sold bond i on day t, ,i tI∆ is the change 
in inventory of all dealers from end of day t-1 to day t, and Buyλ and Sellλ are the regression 
coefficients on change in inventory of the dealers.   
Note that in the regression in equation (11) the term ,i t tD D controls for changes in prices of 
bonds due to changes in the term structure, while Buyλ and Sellλ represent the changes in bond prices 
due to changes in inventory risk exposures. Buyλ and Sellλ are indicators of market quality, where a 
“high quality” market is one in which in which the price is unaffected by the amount of liquidity 
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demanded by public investors, i.e. Buyλ and Sellλ are zero. In the presence of limited market making 
capital, we expect Buyλ and Sellλ to be negative. This is because when dealers buy (sell) bonds, ,i tI∆ is 
positive (negative). This corresponds to selling (buying) pressure from the public, which causes the 
bond prices to fall (rise), thereby making Buyλ and Sellλ negative. 
We implement the regression in equation (11) in the following way. We measure the 
inventory risk exposure (i.e. inventory value of the bond multiplied by its duration) of all dealers in 
each bond at the end of each day and standardize it by subtracting the sample mean and dividing it by 
the time series standard deviation. This makes inventory risk exposure comparable across bonds. For 
the same reason, we also measure the change in price of a bond in percentage terms. The slope 
coefficients Buyλ and Sellλ  then measure the percentage change in price of a bond for one unit change 
in the collective inventory risk exposure of the dealers. 
We rank the overall spot-plus-futures exposure at the end of each of the 358 days in 
descending order. We run the regression on days when the exposure lies in the top decile and in the 
botttom decile. We investigate whether the relative importance of capital adequacy constraints varies 
as the exposure moves away from the extreme by also running the regression in equation (10) for top 
quartile and bottom quartile days, and for above median and below median days22.  
We report our findings in Table VII. Panel A reports the findings for the top decile and 
bottom decile days. For the top decile days, we find that the slope coefficient Buyλ is negative and 
statistically significant suggesting that dealers offer significantly lower prices while buying bonds on 
these days. This is consistent with the dealers’ exposure moving away from the mean as well as the 
negative price impact expected of dealer buy (i.e. public sell) trades observed in equity markets. 
Interestingly, Sellλ is negative but not significant, suggesting that the dealers’ desire to bring the 
                                                 
22 The top and bottom decile analysis covers 35 days each (70 days in total), while the top and bottom quartile 
analysis covers 89 days each (198 days in total). The above median and below median analysis covers the entire 
sample period (356 days).  
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exposure towards the mean is not strong enough to translate itself into significant price effects.  
In contrast, on bottom decile days (second row of Panel A), the slope coefficient Buyλ is 
positive and statistically significant. These trades alleviate capital adequacy constraints as well as 
bring the dealers exposure towards the mean. However, we know that Sellλ is indistinguishable from 
zero on top decile days suggesting that the desire to mean revert does not translate itself into 
significant price effects. Therefore, the positive and significant Buyλ  on bottom decile days must be 
driven by the alleviation of capital adequacy constraints, the effect of which is strong enough to 
overcome any negative price impact the dealer buy (i.e. public sell) trades may have. Furthermore, on 
bottom decile days we find Sellλ to be negative and significant at the ten percent level. This is 
consistent with worsening of capital adequacy constraints as well as these trades taking the dealers 
away from the mean. If one were to assume that the price effects of moving the exposure towards the 
mean or away from the mean are symmetric, then the negative and significant Sellλ  must be due to 
worsening of capital adequacy constraint effect created by dealers’ selective market risk-taking 
activity. This is because we know from the top decile results that dealer sell trades that bring exposure 
towards the mean do not have significant price effects. These findings confirm that dealers market 
risk-taking activity affects market quality, especially when the hedgeable risk exposure carried by 
dealers is at extreme levels.  
 In order to examine the robustness of these findings, we also run the regression for top 
quartile and bottom quartile days and report the findings in Table VII-Panel B. We find results that 
are consistent with the top decile and bottom decile days reported in Panel A. On top quartile days, 
Buyλ is negative and statistically significant at ten percent level while Sellλ is insignificant. On bottom 
quartile days, Buyλ is positive and statistically significant at ten percent level. The only difference 
being that Sellλ now looses its statistical significance on bottom quartile days. Overall, the results are 
qualitatively similar to that found with the extreme decile analysis with the magnitude of the slope 
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coefficients being somewhat reduced. This is to be expected since the quartile based analysis also 
includes days where the deviation from the mean is not as extreme as in case of extreme deciles. 
Therefore, on average, one expects the capital adequacy constraints to be less binding. The findings 
from above median and below median analysis (see Table VII-Panel C) are once again qualitatively 
similar in terms of the magnitude and direction of slope coefficients with the statistical significance 
getting further reduced as we include all days.  
On the whole, the findings in Table VI strongly support the price effects of capital constraints 
argued for by Froot and Stein (1998).  These effects are the strongest when the constraints are most 
binding, i.e., when dealers are carrying a large amount of hedgeable risk on their books, risk that 
could have been laid off in futures markets. Regulators concerned about market quality should take 
notice of the adverse asymmetric price effects of dealers’ selective risk-taking activity. 
 
VII Liquidity Provision and Risk Sharing in Semi-transperent Markets 
In this section, we investigate how the liquidity demanded by investors is provided by dealers 
carrying differing risk exposures. In the theoretical models of competitive dealership markets, like Ho 
and Stoll (1983) or Biais (1993), a dealer’s keenness to buy or sell is a monotone function of her 
inventory – the source of her risk exposure. Therefore, an investor gets the best deal if his buy (sell) 
trade is executed by the dealer with the longest (shortest) exposure. Unfortunately, in the absence of 
full pre-trade transperency, (e.g. through a central quote posting facility or a consolidated limit order 
book) this is difficult to achieve. An investor wishing to trade needs to call and negotiate with dealers 
one by one before he can find the best price. Clearly, this involves considerable search costs and it is 
likely that a public trade is not always executed by the dealer with the extreme exposure. As a result, 
the  investor may end up paying more for a buy trade or receive less for a sell trade. This is a matter of 
concern for regulators whose objective is to minimize investors’ trading costs. 
We use the monotone relationship between the level of exposure and reservation quotes from 
the theoretical models to draw inference about the quality of execution received by investors in the 
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UK government bond market. In particular, we examine whether dealers with relatively long (short) 
exposure sell (buy) a larger proportion of exposure or not.  To operationalise empirical examination of 
this issue, one needs to take account of the fact that dealers’ risk exposures cannot be compared 
against each other directly. This is because dealers have different duration targets and they differ in 
terms of their capitalization or risk aversion. In the presence of duration targeting, what matters in the 
dealer’s decision function is not the level of her risk exposure, but the deviation of her risk exposure 
from the duration target. Also, differences in capitalization or risk aversion imply that a trade of a 
given size will be perceived differently by different dealers. We address these issues by standardizing 
the risk exposure of each dealer (i.e. by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation). 
Subtracting the mean adjusts for differences in duration targets, and dividing by the standard deviation 
enables comparability across firms23. When working with standardized exposures, one can expect that 
a dealer with relatively long (short) exposure, sells (buys) to a greater extent compared to the dealer 
with the median level of exposure. One can also expect that the greater the exposure of a dealer, the 
larger will be the quantity she will be selling and vice-versa. 
We investigate these theoretical predictions in the following way. At the end of each day we 
measure the total (i.e. spot-plus-futures) exposure of each dealer , , ( 1,2,...15)k t k tS F k+ = and arrange 
it in descending order. We assign the dealer with largest (smallest) total exposure an exposure-level-
rank of one (fifteen). Next, we compute , 1 , 1( )k t k tS F+ +∆ +  - the change in the total exposure of each 
dealer over the next day, and rank them so that the dealer who sells the most (least) exposure gets 
change-in-total-exposure rank of one (fifteen). We repeat this exercise for each day in the sample24. If 
the implications of the theoretical models hold in practice, then a dealer with low exposure-level-rank 
                                                 
23 Hansch et al (1998), and Naik and Yadav (1999) use a similar procedure while examining the trading 
behavior of dealers in the equity market. Standardization controls for differences in capitalization or risk 
aversion if it is assumed that different dealers perceive risk in a similar way when their exposure is measured in 
terms of the distance in standard deviations from the duration targets. For expositional convenience, we 
hereafter drop the descriptor standardized unless needed for clarity 
24 Note that as the risk exposure of a dealer changes relative to her competitors from one day to another, she 
receives a different exposure-level rank and a different change-in-exposure rank. In this section we examine the 
relationship between the average change-in-exposure rank of dealers who had the same exposure-level rank the 
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would have a low change-in-exposure rank (i.e. a dealer carrying a greater amount of exposure would 
be selling a larger amount of exposure the next day) and vice-versa. We examine the relation between 
the level-exposure rank at the end of a day and the change-in-total-exposure rank, the change-in-spot-
exposure rank and the change-in-futures-exposure rank over the next day.  
In particular, we run the following regression with the dependent variable being the average 
rank based on change-in-exposure (either total-exposure or spot-exposure or futures-exposure) and the 
independent variable being the end-of-day total exposure rank.  
0 1_ _ _ _l l lAverage Change in Exposure Rank m m Exposure level Rank m= + +  (11) 
where l = 1, 2, …, 15 represents the rank of the dealer depending on her end-of-day total exposure and 
change in respective exposure (total, spot or futures) over the next day.  
We report the results of our investigation in Table VIII and Figure 6. For expositional 
convenience, we subtract the median rank from all change-in exposure-ranks and report them as 
deviation from the median rank. We find that as far as change-in-total-exposure is concerned (see 
Table VIII-Panel A), the findings are highly consistent with the implications of the theoretical models. 
Dealers with top five (bottom five) exposure levels show a change in total exposure that is statistically 
significantly greater (smaller) than the median dealer. The regression of change-in-total-exposure rank 
on the exposure-level-rank provides a slope coefficient of -0.18 with a t-stat. of -13.97, and an 
adjusted R-square of 93 percent. The regression confirms that dealers with relatively long 
standardized exposure sell a greater standardized exposure the next day, and vice-versa. This finding 
is illustrated in Figure 6-Panel A. 
The findings with changes in futures exposure are qualitatively similar (see Table VIII-Panel 
B). Dealers with top four (bottom two) exposure levels show a change in futures exposure that is 
statistically significantly greater (smaller) than the median dealer. The regression of change-in-
futures-exposure rank on the exposure-level-rank provides a slope coefficient of -0.10 with a t-
statistic of -10.19, and an adjusted R-square of 88 percent. The regression confirms that dealers with 
                                                                                                                                                        
previous day. 
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relatively long standardized exposure sell greater standardized exposure in the futures market the next 
day, and vice-versa. This relationship is depicted in Figure 6-Panel B. 
However, there is virtually no relationship between the end-of-day-total-exposure and the 
change-in-spot-exposure (see Table VIII-Panel C). Eleven dealers exhibit a change in spot exposure 
that is indistinguishable from that of the median dealer, and the dealers that exhibit a change in spot 
exposure that is statistically significantly greater (smaller) than the median dealer, are not those with 
extreme ranks (level rank of four, eight, thirteen and fourteen). The regression of change-in-spot-
exposure rank on the exposure-level-rank provides a slope coefficient of -0.02 with a t-statistic of -
0.84, and an adjusted R-square of minus two percent. In other words, dealers with relatively long 
standardized exposure do not necessarily sell greater standardized exposure in the spot market the 
next day, and vice-versa. This is visually highlighted in Figure 6-Panel C. 
The sharp contrast between the results in Panels B and C of Table VIII and of Figure 6 
indicates the following. Dealers actively control their total standardized risk exposure. Whenever their 
standardized exposure becomes long relative to that of the median dealer, they offload a part of it and 
vice-versa. However, they seem to rely on the futures market (which is highly transparent and 
efficient) to achieve this rather than the spot market (which has limited transparency).   
The findings in Table VIII-Panel C have important implications for the regulators concerned 
about the quality of execution received by trades in these markets. We know from theoretical models 
that dealers with extreme risk exposures offer most competitive prices. To the extent that public buy 
(sell) trades in the spot market are not executed by dealers having relatively long (short) standardized 
exposure, these trades are not likely to receive the best possible price. Clearly, by enabling a better 
matching between public trades and dealers with divergent exposure, the quality of execution can be 
improved in the UK government bond market. The possible ways of achieving a better matching 
between public investors (liquidity demanders) and dealers with divergent exposure (ideally placed 
liquidity providers) are the introduction of a central quote posting system or a consolidated limit order 
book.  Such market reforms would reduce search costs, enable better matching between buyers and 
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sellers, and thereby improve risk sharing and liquidity provision in these markets. 
VIII Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we employed a comprehensive dataset from the Bank of England containing the 
close-of-business spot and futures positions of fifteen UK government bond dealers to provide 
empirical evidence how market intermediaries manage the hedgeable market component of their core 
business risk and its relationship with market quality in the context of capital constraints. We found 
that dealers are extensively engaged in selective market risk-taking through a duration targeting 
policy, and during our sample period, their duration target was consistently negative. The size of their 
futures position was comparable in magnitude to their spot position and the futures position usually 
reinforced the risk of their spot position. The dealers actively used futures contracts to partially hedge 
the changes in their spot position. We found that dealers used futures markets to a greater extent when 
the cost of hedging was lower (an evidence consistent with Stulz (1984)), when the costs of regulatory 
distress through breach of capital adequacy requirements were greater, and during periods of greater 
economic uncertainty.  
 We also found that higher turnover dealers carried a greater amount of risk on their books and 
hedged the changes in their spot risk less compared to lower turnover dealers. This behaviour is 
consistent with the predictions of Stulz (1996). Interestingly, we found that higher turnover dealers 
did not earn significantly greater profits than lower turnover dealers from their selective risk taking 
policy. This suggested that the government bond market was reasonably efficient and the 
informational advantage of higher turnover bond dealers as a result of executing a greater proportion 
of order flow, was more perceived than real.  
As regards to market quality, we found strong and asymmetric price effects when dealers 
carried substantial market risk exposure on their books. Trades that worsened (relaxed) dealers’ 
capital adequacy constraints experienced significantly worse (better) prices. This finding lends strong 
support to Froot and Stein’s (1998) argument about price effects of capital constraints. We believe 
that regulators interested in market quality should be concerned about this adverse effect of dealers’ 
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duration targeting activity.     
Finally, on the subject of risk sharing among dealers, we found that dealers with relatively 
long (short) stadardized total risk exposures sold (bought) a greater amount of standardized total risk 
exposure the next day. However, this seemed to be driven by their trading in the futures market and 
not by their trading in the spot market. In the spot market, we did not find that dealers with longer 
(shorter) standardized total risk exposure sold (bought) greater amount of spot risk. This finding has 
important implications for the regulators concerned about the quality of execution offered to public 
investors. In the context of Ho and Stoll (1983) and Biais (1993), to the extent that public buy (sell) 
trades are not executed by dealers with extreme long (short) exposures (relative to their duration 
targets), these trades will not receive the best execution possible. This suggests that trading costs in 
this government bond market can be lowered if investors can be matched more effectively with 
dealers carrying extreme exposures. This can be achieved by the introduction of market reforms such 
as having a central quote posting facility or a consolidated limit order book. Such reforms will enable 
a better matching of liquidity demanders (i.e. investors) and most suitable liquidity providers (dealers 
with extreme exposures). They would reduce trading costs of investors, and improve risk sharing and 
liquidity provision in these markets. 
Although this paper analysed the UK government bond market, we believe that our findings 
can be generalised to intermediaries operating in a wide range of other spot markets, in particular, the 
foreign exchange market, the Treasury bond market and numerous over-the-counter markets. The 
intermediaries in these markets face conditions and incentives that are not dissimilar to those faced by 
our bond dealers. These other markets also have a decentralized semi-transparent structure, and the 
asset traded is also a macro-economic variable with largely public information. Furthermore, there 
exist liquid futures markets that enable efficient hedgeing of market risk. Finally, the dealers 
competing of business in these markets also face capital adequacy constraints, which may be either 
explicitly imposed by regulators or implicitly imposed through the risk budgeting process within 
dealer firms. Therefore, we believe that our findings are likely to characterise, to a great extent, the 
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behaviour of intermediaries in these other markets as well.  
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Appendix A: Names and Amounts Outstanding of the UK Govt. bonds 
Short Maturity Amount £ m  Long Amount £ m
9 Treasury 1994 1,400  8 3/4 Treasury 2017 6,950 
12 ½ Exchequer 1994 1,240  8 Treasury 2013 4,950 
10 ¼ Exchequer 1995 2,500  9 Treasury 2012 5,150 
12 ¾ Treasury 1995 840  9 Conversion 2011 4,273 
12 Treasury 1995 2,350  6 1/4 Treasury 2010 4,750 
10 Conversion 1996 3,409  8 Treasury 2009 3,100 
15 ¼ Treasury 1996 1,150  Double-dated  
13 ¼ Exchequer 1996 800  11 3/4 Treasury 2003/2007 3,150 
14 Treasury 1996 770  12 1/2 Treasury 2003/2005 2,200 
8 ¾ Treasury 1997 5,550  8 Treasury 2002/2006 2,000 
10 ½ Exchequer 1997 3,700  11 1/2 Treasury 2001/2004 1,620 
7 Treasury Conv 1997 2,000  13 1/2 Treasury 2004/2008 1,250 
13 ¼ Treasury 1997 1,290  6 3/4 Treasury 1995/1998 1,200 
15 Exchequer 1997 830  12 Exchequer 2013/2017 1,000 
7 ¼ Treasury 1998 7,850  5 1/2 Treasury 2008/2012 1,000 
12 Exchequer 1998 3,909  14 Treasury 1998/2001 970 
9 ¾ Exchequer 1998 3,550  7 3/4 Treasury 2012/2015 800 
15 ½ Treasury 1998 935  3 1/2 Funding 1999/2004 543 
6 Treasury 1999 5,900  12 Exchequer 1999/2002 105 
Floating Rate 1999 2,500  13 3/4 Treasury 2000/2003 53 
12 ¼ Exchequer 1999 3,050  15 Exchequer 1990/95 214 
9 ½ Treasury 1999 1,900  Undated  
10 1/4 Conversion 1999 1,798  3 1/2 War 1,909 
10 1/2 Treasury 1999 1,252  3 1/2 Conv 119 
Medium   2 1/2 Treasury 475 
9 Conversion 2000 5,358  4 Consolidated 359 
8 Treasury 2000 4,800  2 1/2 Consolidated 275 
13 Treasury 2000 3,171  3 Treasury 56 
8 ½ Treasury 2000 109  2 1/2 Annuities 3 
7 Treasury '2001'A 2,500  2 3/4 Annuities 1 
10 Treasury 2001 4,406  Index-Linked  
9 ¾ Conversion 2001 35  2 1/2 I-L Treasury 2001 1,500 
9 ½ Conversion 2001 3  2 1/2 I-L Treasury 2003 1,050 
9 ¾ Treasury 2002 6,527  4 3/8 I-L Treasury 2004 1,000 
9 Exchequer 2002 83  2 I-L Treasury 2006 1,550 
10 Conversion 2002 21  2 1/2 I-L Treasury 2009 1,550 
9 ½ Conversion 2002 2  2 1/2 I-L Treasury 2011 1,950 
8 Treasury 2003 7,600  2 1/2 I-L Treasury 2013 2,300 
10 Treasury 2003 2,503  2 1/2 I-L Treasury 2016 2,550 
9 ¾ Conversion 2003 11  2 1/2 I-L Treasury 2020 2,400 
6 ¾ Treasury 2004 6,250  2 1/2 I-L Treasury 2024 2,000 
9 ½ Conversion 2004 3,412  4 1/8 I-L Treasury 2030 1,300 
10 Treasury 2004 20  2 I-L Treasury 1996 1,200 
8 ½ Treasury 2005 8,900  4 5/8 I-L Treasury 1998 800 
9 ½ Conversion 2005 4,842  2 1/2 I-L Treasury Conv 1999 2 
7 ¾ Treasury 2006 3,900    
9 ¾ Conversion 2006 6    
8 ½ Treasury 2007 5,497    
9 Treasury 2008 5,321    
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Appendix B: Salient Financial Details of UK Government Bond Dealer Firms in London 
 
Trading in UK Government bonds is organised on the London Stock Exchange in a competitive dealership environment.  Each dealer firm is required to be an independent 
legal entity separately capitalised from the parent company. The dealer firms are private companies not listed or quoted or traded on any exchange. This appendix lists salient 
financial information for dealer firms for which the UK Companies House could provide us the annual reports. The information below corresponds to the latest accounting 
year-end date falling within the sample period (August 1994 to December 1995) for the particular company. All figures are in millions of Pound Sterling. 
 
 
Name of Dealer Firm 
 
Name of Ultimate Parent 
 
Paid Up Equity 
Share Capital 
 
P & L 
Reserves 
 
Sundry 
Reserves 
 
Shareholders 
Funds 
 
Profit (Loss) 
 
Baring Sterling Bonds (Unlimited) 
 
ING, Netherlands 
 
18.9 
 
(11.8) 
 
0.0 
 
7.1 
 
0.8 
 
Credit Suisse First Boston Gilts Ltd 
 
Credit Suisse Group, Switzerland 
 
16.7 
 
(7.9) 
 
7.5 
 
16.3 
 
0.1 
 
Deutsche Bank Gilts Ltd 
 
Deutsche Bank AG, Germany 
 
30.0 
 
(4.3) 
 
0.0 
 
25.7 
 
(5.3) 
 
Goldman Sachs Government 
Securities (UK)  
 
Goldman Sachs Group ,USA. 
 
2.6 
 
(25.8) 
 
67.4 
 
44.2 
 
(1.1) 
 
Greenwich Natwest Gilts Ltd 
 
National Westminster Bank plc, UK 
 
33.0 
 
(13.6) 
 
0 
 
19.4 
 
0.3 
 
HSBC Greenwell (Unlimited) 
 
HSBC Holdings plc 
 
30.0 
 
9.5 
 
- 
 
39.5 
 
5.9 
 
J P Morgan Sterling Securities Ltd 
 
J P Morgan & Co, USA  
 
19.0 
 
(10.2) 
 
31.5 
 
40.3 
 
0.8 
 
Kleinwort Bensen Gilts Ltd 
 
Dresdener Bank (Germany) AG 
 
5.2 
 
11.1 
 
0.0 
 
16.3 
 
(0.8) 
 
Merrill Lynch Gilts Ltd 
 
Merrill Lynch & Co  Inc, USA 
 
33.0 
 
2.4 
 
0.0 
 
35.4 
 
4.3 
 
Nomura Gilts Limited 
 
The Nomura Securities Co Ltd, Japan 
 
20.0 
 
1.3 
 
0.0 
 
21.3 
 
0.2 
 
Societe Generale Gilts Ltd 
 
Societe Generale (France) 
 
15.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
15.0 
 
(1.6) 
 
UBS Securities Trading Ltd 
 
Union Bank of Switzerland 
 
24.0 
 
10.7 
 
0.0 
 
34.7 
 
(2.3) 
   Source: The UK Companies House  
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Table I: Salient Features of the Data 
The top panel reports the mean, median, minimum, maximum and Overall values of magnitude of total (spot-plus-futures) exposure, spot exposure, futures exposure, the 
magnitude of futures exposure as a percentage of total exposure, mean offset by futures exposure of spot exposure, mean offset by demeaned futures exposure of demeaned 
spot exposure and percentage of days when demeaned futures exposure is of the opposite sign of the spot exposure using theoretical (duration-based) risk measure as well as 
empirical (regression beta-based) risk measure. 
 
With Theoretical Risk Measure   With Empirical Risk Measure   Sample Statistics Across the Fifteen UK 
Government Bond Dealers  
Mean Median Minim. Maxim. Overall Mean Median Minim. Maxim. Overall 
Magnitude of Total Risk Exposure £ m 12 10 2 32 161 10 8 1 26 134 
Spot Risk Exposure £ m -6 -3 -28 11 -87 -4 -3 -22 7 -61 
Futures Risk Exposure £ m -5 -3 -20 0 -73 -5 -3 -20 0 -73 
Futures Exposure as % of Total Exposure 36 33 16 60 47 42 43 20 63 53 
Mean offset by Futures of Spot Exp. %  27 19 2 67 3 30 27 3 65 5 
Mean offset by demeaned F of demeaned S % 40 36 16 75 50 44 44 8 72 58 
Days when demeaned F and S offset  %  68 69 44 93 72 71 76 37 91 79 
 
The bottom panel reports the mean, median, minimum, maximum and Overall values of average daily profits from risk taking as well as average daily profits per unit of risk 
taking using the empirical risk measure. 
 
Average Daily Profits (in £ ’000) Average Daily Scaled Profits (in basis points) Sample Statistics Across the Fifteen UK 
Government Bond Dealers  
Mean Median Minim. Maxim. Overall Mean Median Minim. Maxim. Overall 
Overnight Profit from Risk Taking Activity -2.6 -3.0 -54 40 22 -1.3 -4.5 -40 25 0.3 
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Table II: Mean Reversion in Dealers’ Total Risk Exposure 
This table shows the mean reversion coefficients of the following regression for each dealer using the theoretical 
(based on duration) measure or risk as well as empirical (based on beta vis-à-vis futures contract) measure. 
, , , , ,( ) ( )k t k t k k k t k t k tS F S Fα γ ε∆ + = + + +  
Figures in bold face (italics) indicate mean-reversion coefficients that are statistically significant at five (ten) 
percent level. 
Theoretical Measure of Risk Empirical Measure of Risk 
Dealer 
Kγ  Adj-Rsq. Half-life Kγ  Adj-Rsq. Half-life 
1 -0.20 (-6.20) 9.76 3.1 
-0.22 
(-6.53) 10.71 2.9 
2 
-0.02 
(-1.05) 0.75 33.9 
-0.02 
(-1.20) 0.97 28.0 
3 -0.06 (-3.31) 2.99 11.3 
-0.13 
(-4.94) 6.43 5.1 
4 -0.09 (-4.08) 4.48 7.3 
-0.10 
(-4.35) 5.07 6.5 
5 
-0.03 
(-1.85) 0.63 36.3 
-0.05 
(-2.80) 2.15 14.4 
6 -0.10 (-4.26) 4.85 6.8 
-0.05 
(-3.25) 2.88 13.1 
7 -0.06 (-3.42) 3.19 10.1 
-0.15 
(-5.43) 7.67 4.3 
8 -0.07 (-3.62) 3.55 17.9 
-0.04 
(-2.76) 2.10 17.3 
9 -0.15 (-5.31) 7.37 4.3 
-0.10 
(-4.45) 5.28 6.3 
10 -0.05 (-2.88) 2.29 14.9 
-0.17 
(-5.74) 8.49 3.7 
11 -0.03 (-2.01) 1.12 26.1 
-0.05 
(-2.84) 2.22 13.5 
12 -0.12 (-4.64) 5.71 5.6 
-0.13 
(-4.82) 6.15 5.2 
13 -0.06 (-3.38) 3.11 10.9 
-0.20 
(-6.22) 9.83 3.0 
14 -0.18 (-6.06) 9.38 3.4 
-0.36 
(-8.79) 17.88 1.6 
15 
-0.03 
(-1.64) 1.49 25.6 
-0.03 
(-1.76) 1.71 22.6 
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Table III: Changes in the Futures Exposure and Changes in the Spot Exposure 
 
This table shows the coefficients of the following regression for each of the fifteen bond dealers using 
theoretical and empirical measures or risk exposures:  
 
tktklktkkktk ShShF ,1,,,, εα +∆+∆+=∆ −  
 
where k indicates the dealer (k=1, 2 .... 15), tkF ,∆  is the change in Futures Exposure of dealer k from 
end of day t-1 to end of day t, tkS ,∆  is the change in Spot Exposure of dealer k from end of day t-1 to 
end of day t, 1, −∆ tkS is lagged changed in Spot Exposure of dealer k, kh and lkh , are contemporaneous 
and lagged hedge ratios, and kα  and tk ,ε  are the intercept and error terms respectively. The table 
reports results t-statistics of the hedge ratios are reported in parentheses. Figures in bold face indicate 
significance at 5% level. Hedge ratios indistinguishable from –1.0 at 5% level are denoted with an 
asterisk. 
 
With Theoretical Measure of Risk Exposure With Empirical Measure of Risk Exposure Dealer 
 K Hedge Ratio 
kh  
Lagged Hedge 
Ratio, lkh ,  
Adjusted 
R-square 
Hedge Ratio 
kh  
 
Lagged Hedge 
Ratio, lkh ,  
Adjusted 
R-square 
1 -0.37 (-8.69) 
-0.09 
(-2.13) 22.9% 
-0.47 
(-8.80) 
-0.12 
(-2.39) 23.1% 
2 -0.42 (-8.13) 
-0.10 
(-1.97) 20.5% 
-0.36 
(-6.00) 
-0.16 
(-2.02) 13.0% 
3 -0.39 (-11.93) 
0.06 
(1.63) 34.2% 
-0.51 
(-11.57) 
0.03 
(0.74) 33.0% 
4 -0.42 (-7.70) 
-0.02 
(-0.53) 22.7% 
-0.52 
(-7.94) 
0.01 
(0.23) 23.7% 
5 -0.76 (-20.88) 
-0.02 
(-0.78) 62.1% 
-0.99* 
(-23.17) 
-0.03 
(-0.67) 64.9% 
6 -0.27 (-6.02) 
-0.08 
(-2.00) 11.8% 
-0.33 
(-5.95) 
-0.11 
(-1.98) 11.7% 
7 -0.20 (-3.50) 
0.03 
(0.50) 4.3% 
-0.23 
(-3.07) 
0.05 
(0.65) 3.1% 
8 -0.66 (-14.50) 
-0.09 
(-2.09) 43% 
-0.85 
(-15.83) 
-0.06 
(-0.97) 47% 
9 -0.47 (-8.02) 
-0.10 
(-1.76) 18.4% 
-0.63 
(-7.60) 
-0.17 
(-2.23) 17.5% 
10 -0.59 (-12.15) 
0.01 
(0.28) 35% 
-0.68 
(-11.74) 
-0.03 
(-0.55) 35.2% 
11 -0.67 (-17.14) 
-0.07 
(-1.97) 49.9% 
-1.00* 
(-20.47) 
-0.04 
(-0.82) 59.6% 
12 -0.80* (-6.63) 
0.01 
(0.06) 50.7% 
-0.94* 
(-5.76) 
0.01 
(0.05) 45.1% 
13 -0.44 (-9.21) 
0.11 
(1.43) 25.3% 
-0.43 
(-7.68) 
0.05 
(0.86) 19.3% 
14 -0.55 (-15.13) 
-0.13 
(-3.58) 50.5% 
-1.06* 
(-25.84) 
-0.12 
(-3.15) 73.8% 
15 -0.68 (-10.97) 
-0.13 
(-2.27) 44% 
-0.67 
(-7.69) 
-0.26 
(-1.05) 12.6% 
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Table IV: Hedge Ratios in different Market Conditions 
 
This table examines the determinants of the time-series variation in the hedge ratios and reports the 
results from the following regression:  
 
 
( )
, 0 , , , , 1
1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 5 6 , ,
( )k t k t k k t k l k t
Std Std Misp Ann dbAnn
t k t k t t t t k t k t
F D h S h S
Vol S S D D D S
γ
γ γ γ γ γ γ ω
−
− −
∆ = + Σ ∆ + ∆
+ + + ∆ + + + ∆ +
 
where k indicates the dealer (k=1, 2 .... 15), tkF ,∆  is the change in Futures Exposure of dealer k from 
end of day t-1 to end of day t, tkS ,∆  is the change in Spot Exposure of dealer k from end of day t-1 to 
end of day t, 1, −∆ tkS is lagged changed in Spot Exposure of dealer k, kh and lkh , are contemporaneous 
and lagged hedge ratios, tkD , is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for observations 
corresponding to dealer k, Volt is the standardized absolute value of the open-to-close price change of 
the near maturity long gilt futures contract, , 1
Std
k tS −  ( , 1
Std
k tS −∆ ) is the standardized level (change in level) 
of dealer k’s spot exposure as the end of day t-1, MisptD  is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 
when hedging requires buying (selling) underpriced (overpriced) futures and the value -1 when 
hedging requires selling (buying) underpriced (overpriced) futures, AnntD  (
dbAnn
tD ) is a dummy 
variable indicating if day t was an announcement day (a day before an announcement day), 0γ and 
tk ,ω are the intercept and error terms respectively. 
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Theoretical Measure of Risk Exposure Empirical Measure of Risk Exposure Dealer 
K 
kh  lkh ,  Slope  Coefficients 
on 
kh  lkh ,  Slope  Coefficients 
on 
1 -0.33 (-5.59) 
-0.09 
(-2.03) 
-0.39 
(-5.26) 
-0.12 
(-2.17) 
2 -0.43 (-8.37) 
-0.11 
(-2.61) 
-0.38 
(-6.33) 
-0.18 
(-3.11) 
3 -0.40 (-6.87) 
0.06 
(1.32) 
-0.49 
(-6.31) 
0.02 
(0.24) 
4 -0.41 (-5.14) 
-0.06 
(-0.80) 
-0.47 
(-4.66) 
-0.03 
(-0.35) 
5 -0.80 (-13.54) 
-0.01 
(-0.38) 
-1.03* 
(-14.26) 
-0.02 
(-0.35) 
6 -0.26 (-3.68) 
-0.09 
(-1.51) 
-0.32 
(-3.35) 
-0.09 
(-1.07) 
7 -0.38 (-8.46) 
0.04 
(1.44) 
-0.40 
(-7.16) 
0.07 
(1.58) 
8 -0.66 (-15.39) 
-0.08 
(-3.10) 
-0.82 
(-15.18) 
-0.04 
(-1.40) 
9 -0.51 (-6.96) 
-0.06 
(-1.01) 
-0.67 
(-6.28) 
-0.12 
(-1.35) 
10 -0.63 (-4.75) 
-0.00 
(-0.00) 
-0.72* 
(-4.33) 
-0.05 
(-0.27) 
11 -0.69 (-3.17) 
-0.07 
(-0.34) 
-1.03* 
(-3.22) 
-0.02 
(-0.06) 
12 
-0.91 
(-1.21) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-1.15 
(-1.19) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
13 -0.46 (-3.13) 
0.10 
(0.73) 
-0.39 
(-2.35) 
0.02 
(0.10) 
14 -0.54 (-3.44) 
-0.11 
(-0.68) 
-0.97* 
(-3.74) 
-0.11 
(-0.44) 
15 -0.72 (-4.26) 
-0.13 
(-0.88) 
 
-0.63 
(-2.92) 
-0.24 
(-1.22) 
 
Volatility -0.03 
(-2.01) 
-0.03 
(-0.64) 
Lagged Exposure -0.08 
(-5.89) 
-0.10 
(-6.26) 
Mispricing -0.07 
(-5.82) 
-0.06 
(-3.53) 
Lagged Delta S  -0.10 
(-3.88) 
-0.14 
(-4.25) 
Announcement 
Day dummy 
0.11 
(2.84) 
0.22 
(4.58) 
Day before 
announc. Dummy 
-0.14 
(-3.19) 
-0.14 
(-2.84) 
Adj. R-sq. 
 
32.2% 
 
30.7% 
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Table V: Relationship between Risk Taking, Hedging and Profits and Dealer Turnover 
This table reports the findings when the Duration Ranks, Hedge Ratio Ranks and Profitability Ranks of dealers 
are regressed on their Turnover Ranks according to the following cross-sectional regressions (k=1, 2, …, 15). 
0 1
0 1
0 1
k kk
k k k
k k k
Duration Rank c c Turnover Rank f
Hedge Ratio Rank d d Turnover Rank g
Profit Rank e e Turnover Rank n
= + +
= + +
= + +
 
The t-statistic is in the parentheses. Figures in bold face indicate significance at the five percent level. 
 
Panel A: Duration Rank Regression:   
Risk Measure used Intercept Slope Coefficient Adjusted R-square 
Theoretical 
2.80 
(1.46) 
0.65 
(3.08) 37.8% 
Empirical 
2.14 
(1.25) 
0.73 
(3.87) 50.0% 
 
Panel B: Hedge Ratio Rank Regression:  
Risk Measure used Intercept Slope Coefficient Adjusted R-square 
Theoretical  
3.15 
(1.58) 
0.60 
(2.75) 31.8% 
Empirical 
3.31 
(1.62) 
0.59 
(2.61) 29.3% 
 
Panel C: Profit Rank Regression:  
Profit Measure used Intercept Slope Coefficient Adjusted R-square 
Average Daily Profit 
10.43 
(4.34) 
-0.30 
(-1.15) 2.2% 
Average Daily Scaled Profit 
10.26 
(4.24) 
-0.28 
(-1.06) 0.9% 
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Table VI: Price Effects of Capital Constraints 
This table lists the three economic effects that may be important in the ask or bid price price charged to a dealer 
sell or dealer buy trade. It highlights whether the economic effect is likely to have significant price effect and if 
so, in which direction theory predicts it will move the bid and ask prices.  
 
 Dealer Buys Dealer Sells 
Exposure 
In Top 
Decile 
* Capital adequacy unimportant 
* Away from the mean  
   => offer worse prices (lower bid price)  
* Price impact – negative (lower bid price) 
* Capital adequacy unimportant  
* Towards the mean  
    => offer price improvement (lower ask price) 
* Price impact effects – nil 
Exposure 
In 
Bottom 
Decile 
* Capital adequacy considerations very 
important, buy trade relaxes capital adequacy 
constraints   => bid higher price, 
* Towards the mean  
   => offer price improvement (higher bid) 
* Price impact – negative (lower bid price) 
* Capital adequacy considerations very 
important, sell trade worsens capital adequacy 
constraints  => ask higher price 
* Away from the mean  
    => charge worse prices (ask for higher price) 
* Price impact effects – nil 
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 Table VII: Price Effects of Capital Constraints  
 
This table reports the findings from the following regression when the Overall total exposure belong to the top 
and bottom decile days, top and bottom quartile days and above median and below median days. 
, , , , , , ,i t i t t Buy Buy i t i t Sell Sell i t i t i tP D D D D I D D Iλ λ ξ∆ = Σ + ∆ + ∆ +  
where ,i tP∆ is the percentage change in the price of bond i on day t, ,i tD is duration of bond i on day t, tD  is a 
dummy representing the day of the sample period, BuyD and SellD are dummies that take value of one if the 
dealers have collectively bought or sold bond i on day t, ,i tI∆ is the change in inventory of all dealers on day t, 
and Buyλ and Sellλ are the regression coefficients on change in inventory of the dealers. The t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. Figures in bold face (italics) indicate significance at the five (ten) percent level. 
 
 
Panel A: Extreme Decile-based Analysis 
Days selected Buyλ  Sellλ  Adj.-Rsquare 
Top Decile days -2.54 (-3.71) 
-0.70 
(-1.01) 60.4% 
Bottom Decile days 2.15 (2.00) 
-1.88 
(-1.78) 82.1% 
 
Panel B: Extreme Quartile-based Analysis 
Days selected Buyλ  Sellλ  Adj.-Rsquare 
Top Quartile days 
-0.98 
(-1.81) 
-0.54 
(-0.99) 66.3% 
Bottom Quartile days 
1.30 
(1.65) 
-1.15 
(-1.49) 81.6% 
 
Panel C: Above Median versus Below Median Analysis 
Days selected Buyλ  Sellλ  Adj.-Rsquare 
Above Median days 
-0.72 
(-1.06) 
-0.30 
(-0.45) 61.9% 
Below Median days 
0.31 
(0.46) 
-0.90 
(-1.33) 78.3% 
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Table VIII: Relationship between dealers’ total risk exposure level at the end of a day  
and the change in exposure on the next day 
This table reports the relationship between a dealer’s end-of-day total-exposure-level rank and her average 
change-in-exposure rank on the next day. The average change-in-exposure rank is reported as deviation from the 
median rank of eight and the t-statistic is in the parentheses. Figures in bold face indicate the average change-in-
exposure ranks that are significantly different from the median rank at the five percent level. 
 
A dealer’s total-
exposure-level rank at 
the end of a given day  
Corresponding 
change-in- total-exposure 
rank   on the next day 
Corresponding change-in- 
futures-exposure rank on 
the next day 
Corresponding change-
in-spot- exposure rank on 
the next day 
1 1.49  (6.06) 
0.61 
(2.51) 
-0.26 
(-1.15) 
2 0.95 (3.97) 
0.47 
(2.00) 
-0.05 
(-0.25) 
3 0.97 (4.30) 
0.46 
(1.97) 
0.18 
(0.76) 
4 0.45 (1.99) 
0.46 
(2.02) 
0.48 
(2.15) 
5 0.52 (2.29) 
0.33 
(1.37) 
-0.06 
(-0.26) 
6 
0.09 
(0.39) 
0.20 
(0.92) 
-0.37 
(-1.57) 
7 
-0.02 
(-0.08) 
0.15 
(0.66) 
0.22 
(0.94) 
8 
0.38 
(1.42) 
0.22 
(1.06) 
0.80 
3.39 
9 
-0.04 
(-0.17) 
-0.09 
(-0.39) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
10 
-0.16 
(-0.72) 
-0.20 
(-0.89) 
0.03 
(0.12) 
11 -0.47 (-2.27) 
-0.32 
(-1.55) 
0.26 
(1.09) 
12 -0.69 (-3.16) 
-0.18 
(-0.82) 
-0.14 
(-0.63) 
13 -0.82 (-3.68) 
-0.25 
(1.16) 
-0.66 
(-2.98) 
14 -1.03 (-4.48) 
-0.79 
(-3.32) 
-0.60 
(-2.87) 
15 -1.63 (-7.04) 
-1.07 
(-4.54) 
0.17 
(0.73) 
 
The table below reports the results of the following cross-sectional regression (l=1, 2, …, 15): 
0 1( _ _ _ ) ( _ )l l lAverage Change in Exposure Rank m m Exposure level Rank m= + +  
Dependent variable:  
Average change-in  
Intercept Slope Coefficient Adjusted R-square 
Total-exposure-rank  over next day 1.45 (12.29) 
-0.18 
(12.29) 93% 
Futures-exposure-rank over next day 0.81 (8.97) 
-0.10 
(10.19) 88% 
Spot-exposure rank over next day 
0.16 
(0.74) 
-0.02 
(-0.84) -2% 
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Figure 2: Beta versus Duration of Individual Bonds   
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Figure 1A: Zero Coupon Yield Curves before the Sample  Period
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Figure  1B: Zero Coupon Yie ld Curves During the  Sample Period
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Figure 3: Evolution of the "Theoretical Measure" of Spot and Futures Exposure 
over Time for the fifteen Dealers as a Group
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Figure 4: Evolution of the " Empirical Measure " of Spot and Futures Exposure over Time  
for the fifteen Dealers as a Group 
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Figure 5: Evolution of the Empirical Measure of Total (Spot-plus-Futures) Exposure  
over Time for the fifteen Dealers as a Group 
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Figure 6: Change-in-Exposure (Total, Futures or Spot) Rank versus Exposure-level Rank 
Panel A: Average Change in Total (Spot-plus-Futures) Exposure Rank 
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Panel B: Average Change in Futures Exposure Rank 
Change-in-Futures-Exposure Rank versus Exposure-Level Rank
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Panel C: Average Change in Spot Exposure Rank 
Change-in-Spot-Exposure versus Exposure-Level Rank
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